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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Executive Registry

84-2131

May 21, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We strongly support your bold efforts to defend American national security in the Caribbean and in Central America. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has written the following statement to us recently:

"Whether the stopovers on Cuba of [Soviet] reconnaissance and ASW Bears constitute 'deployment' in a legal or strategic sense and whether they or Soviet military equipment furnished to Cuba are 'offensive weapons' within the terms of the 1962 U.S. - USSR agreements, as later amplified, are questions of considerable importance and implications, which are addressed at the highest levels of the U.S. government."

The 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement was supposed to "halt further introduction of offensive weapons" [i.e. Soviet offensive missiles, bombers, submarines, and other offensive weapons, which Khrushchev even defined as including Soviet troops] into Cuba "as firm undertakings" on the part of "both" the U.S. and the Soviet governments.

You stated quite courageously at a press conference in May, 1982:

"You know, there's been other things we think are violations also of the 1962 agreement ..."

On September 14, 1983, you repeated your bold accusation, by stating:

"As far as I'm concerned, that agreement has been abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of what can only be considered offensive weapons, not defensive, there."

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Two letters from the State Department on the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement have recently been delivered to us, and they have raised additional questions. In the first letter, the State Department has stated:

"The basing of any nuclear-armed submarine in Cuba would contravene the U.S. - USSR Understanding on Cuba. The Soviets are aware of this." (Emphasis added.)

From this statement, it seems reasonable to conclude that the publicly acknowledged Soviet basing of Golf and Echo class nuclear armed missile submarines in Cuba in 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1974 should be regarded by the State Department as Soviet contraventions of the Kennedy - Khrushchev Agreement.

There have been other authoritative official U.S. confirmations of Soviet violations. CIA Director William Casey was asked in US News and World Report of March 8, 1982: "Does what is happening now in Cuba violate the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement ending the missile crisis?" CIA Director Casey answered:

"Oh sure it does, because the 1962 agreement said the Soviets would send no offensive weapons, and it also said there would be no export of revolution from Cuba. The agreement has been violated for 20 years." (Emphasis added.)

Also on March 8, 1982, Congressman Jack Kemp asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Is it not true that ... there is a de facto, if not a de jure violation by the Soviet Union of understandings that this country had with them?"

The JCS Chairman answered:

"We interpret ... Soviet actions in Cuba as a violation ... in my judgement, they [the Soviets] have gone beyond the 1962 accords." (Emphasis added.)

On March 11, 1982, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle confirmed that the Soviets had bases in Cuba capable of nuclear attack and he testified to Congress that the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement "had been eroded away to nothing" by Soviet actions.

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In the second letter, the State Department has also stated:

"The Department of State does agree with the President and the other officials [i.e., the Chairman of the JCS, the CIA Director, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy] ... that the Soviet Union has on occasion violated the spirit of the [Kennedy-Khrushchev] Understanding." (Emphasis added.)

This statement is a State Department concession that the Soviet Union has in fact also violated the spirit of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement.

The first State Department letter also states that "All Soviet tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe, including Floggers, are rated as potential nuclear delivery systems." (Emphasis added.) The CIA has told us that the Soviet MIG-21 Fishbed in Cuba has a nuclear delivery capability, and the Defense Department has told us that there are about 200 MIG 21s in Cuba. The April 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power, on Page 75, also gives Soviet MIG-21 Fishbeds a nuclear delivery capability.

Several questions emerge from these State Department concessions concerning the status of Soviet compliance with the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement:


1. If the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement is neither a treaty nor a legally binding international agreement, but is instead a "political understanding," as the State Department maintains, what are the precise terms of this understanding?
2. Does the Soviet deployment of Golf and Echo class nuclear armed submarines in Cuba in the early 1970s constitute "basing" and therefore a contravention or violation of the understanding?
3. What specific Soviet actions violate the "spirit" of the understanding? Have these actions stopped? How dangerous are they to U.S. national security?
4. If Soviet MIG 23 and MIG 27 Flogger aircraft and Soviet MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft are officially credited with a nuclear delivery capability against NATO, why is it that when Floggers and Fishbeds are based in Cuba, their nuclear delivery capability somehow disappears?


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
5. The State Department has promised to answer all of Senator Helms' and Senator Symms' questions. When will these answers be received?

Thank you for your prompt answer to our questions. We strongly support your attempts to uphold the Monroe Doctrine in Central America.

With warmest personal regards.


Steve Symms
United States Senator

Sincerely,

James A. McClure
United States Senator


Jesse Helms
United States Senator

CC: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of State
The Director, CIA
The Director, ACDA
The Chairman, JCS
The National Security Advisor
to the President